On a sun-scorched salt flat in Chile’s Atacama Desert, shimmering pools of lithium brine evaporate under the Andean sky. Half a world away in the dense jungles of the Congo, miners toil to unearth fist-sized chunks of cobalt amid red dust. From the copper belt of Africa to the nickel-rich soils of Indonesia, a high-stakes scramble is under way for the minerals that undergird our clean energy future. Lithium, cobalt, rare earth elements, nickel – once niche commodities – have become strategic resources as essential as oil in the 21st-century quest for technological and green energy supremacyca.rbcwealthmanagement.comgoldmansachs.com. This new race for critical minerals is reshaping geopolitics, economics, and the environment, linking remote mining sites to the highest levels of international diplomacy.
Who Holds the Keys: Critical Minerals and the New Resource Map
The supply of critical minerals is strikingly concentrated in a few countries, creating chokepoints in global supply chains. Lithium – vital for electric vehicle (EV) batteries – is mainly extracted in just a handful of places. Australia alone produces nearly half the world’s lithium, with Chile, China, and Argentina accounting for most of the restourworldindata.org. In 2023, those four countries produced over 90% of global lithium supplyourworldindata.org. Chile also holds the world’s largest lithium reserves (around 9.3 million tons) and sits at the heart of South America’s “lithium triangle,” alongside Argentina and Bolivia, which together boast more than half of known lithium resourcesourworldindata.orgnasdaq.com. Yet Bolivia, despite huge resources, has barely begun commercial productionourworldindata.org – a reminder that having mineral deposits is not the same as controlling their supply.
Other critical materials show similar imbalances. Cobalt, used in many battery chemistries and high-performance alloys, overwhelmingly comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The DRC mines about three-quarters of the world’s cobalt each yearourworldindata.org. But raw cobalt ore from Congo is mostly shipped elsewhere for refining – chiefly to China. Indeed, China dominates the refining stage of the supply chain for cobalt, producing over 75% of the world’s refined cobalt that ends up in batteries and electronicsourworldindata.org. A similar pattern holds for rare earth elements (REEs), the 17 obscure metals critical for magnets, wind turbines, and fighter jets. China is not only the largest miner of rare earth ores; it also controls an estimated 85–90% of global rare earth refining capacitygoldmansachs.com. Even if rare earth deposits exist in places like the United States, Australia, or Myanmar, very few non-Chinese facilities can process them into the purified metals needed for high-tech uses.
Nickel, another battery metal and stainless-steel ingredient, is increasingly sourced from Southeast Asia. Indonesia – once a minor player – leapfrogged to become the world’s top nickel producer after banning raw ore exports to spur domestic processing. Indonesia now accounts for a major share of mined nickel and hosts around 40% of the world’s known nickel reservesourworldindata.org. But much of Indonesia’s nickel is processed with investment and technology from abroad (especially China). In fact, across lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, and other core minerals, China has secured a commanding position in either production or refining – often both. By one analysis, China has on average about two-thirds of the processing capacity for six key energy-transition minerals (lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, graphite, and rare earths)ca.rbcwealthmanagement.com. At the extreme, it controls over 75% of global refining for materials like graphite, rare earths and cobaltca.rbcwealthmanagement.com. Such concentration means that a single nation’s policies or disruptions can send shockwaves through critical mineral supply lines.
Behind these numbers lies a strategic reality: critical minerals have become the new oil of a decarbonizing world – a source of national power and potential vulnerability. The International Energy Agency warned in 2025 that refining of key minerals has grown more geographically concentrated, not less, in recent yearsiea.orgiea.org. Between 2020 and 2024, the top three refining nations increased their market share from 82% to 86% for major battery mineralsiea.org. China alone remains the dominant refiner for 19 of 20 critical minerals analyzed by the IEA, with around 70% of refining capacity on averageiea.org. This tight grip has prompted consumer nations to ask uneasy questions: What if access to these materials is cut off? In 2023–24 those fears stopped being hypothetical, as mineral supplies became weaponized in trade disputes. Beijing imposed export restrictions on strategic minerals like gallium, germanium, and rare earth elements – essential for semiconductors and defense systems – citing national securityiea.org. The move underscored how a “minerals OPEC” of one (China) could leverage its dominance. In parallel, other countries like Indonesia, Chile, and Zimbabwe have enacted export bans or resource nationalist policies to tighten control over their own mineral wealth, adding new twists to the global supply puzzle.
The West’s Wake-Up Call: U.S. and Europe Scramble to Secure Supply
For years, Western nations paid relatively little attention to critical mineral supply chains as China quietly built its dominance. Now, amid surging demand for EVs and renewables – and geopolitical rifts – the United States and its allies are rushing to catch up. Washington’s awakening came with a stark recognition that the U.S., once the arsenal of democracy, has become alarmingly import-dependent for the building blocks of clean technology. By one estimate, the U.S. is totally (100%) reliant on imports for 12 out of 50 designated critical minerals, and over 50% import-reliant for another 17 minerals – with China a leading supplier for many of themca.rbcwealthmanagement.com. This realization has spurred a flurry of new policies aiming to rebuild domestic capabilities and “friend-shore” supply chains away from rivals.
In 2022, the U.S. Congress passed the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), a sweeping climate and industrial policy bill that, among many provisions, tied consumer EV subsidies to critical minerals sourcing. To qualify for full tax credits on an electric car, a certain percentage of the battery’s metals must come from the U.S. or its free-trade partners – not from adversary economies. This threshold starts at 40% and rises in steps (to 80% by 2027), effectively pressuring automakers to procure lithium, cobalt, nickel and more from ally countries or develop domestic mines. The IRA also pumped billions of dollars into incentives for U.S. battery mineral processing, recycling, and mining projects. Meanwhile, the Defense Production Act has been invoked to fund strategic mineral projects, and federal agencies are investing in R&D on alternatives (like cobalt-free batteries) to ease future dependence. In short, America is using an “all of the above” approach – trade agreements, subsidies, and security alliances – to ensure it can access the metals of the clean energy era. As an example, in March 2023 the U.S. signed a critical minerals agreement with Japan covering five battery minerals, aiming to bolster joint supply chains and reduce reliance on Chinasgp.fas.org. Similar negotiations with the EU and other allies have followed. The urgency reflects a new consensus in Washington: control of critical minerals is a national security priority, intertwined with competition against China and the imperative to combat climate change.
Across the Atlantic, Europe has likewise mobilized, albeit with its own twist. The European Union unveiled a Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) in 2023 (entering into force in 2024) to shore up supply resilience. This legislation sets ambitious (if non-binding) targets for 2030: the EU aims to extract at least 10% of the critical raw materials it consumes from European mines, process 40% of its needs domestically, and recycle 15–25% of its materials, while capping reliance on any single foreign country at 65% of supplyglobalpolicywatch.com. These targets cover a list of “strategic raw materials” like lithium, cobalt, graphite, nickel, and rare earths. To meet them, Brussels is streamlining permits for new mines and refineries, funding research into substitutes, and striking partnerships abroad. European leaders have inked deals with resource-rich nations from Namibia and the DRC to Canada and Chile, often emphasizing sustainable and ethical mining practices. For example, the EU has supported projects in Africa to improve traceability of cobalt (to ensure it’s not fueling conflict or child labor). Yet Europe’s quest for “strategic autonomy” in minerals is fraught with its own dependencies. The continent currently refines little of these minerals at home and remains behind in the battery supply chain. By 2025, as EV production ramps up, Europe’s import needs for battery-grade lithium, nickel and rare earths are set to soar. The CRMA’s 65% single-supplier cap is clearly aimed at China – a recognition in Brussels that reliance on Chinese refineries (often well above 65% today) poses a riskglobalpolicywatch.com. Whether Europe can diversify in time is an open question, but the political will has sharpened. In just one year, the EU proposed and enacted the CRMA, a signal of how high the stakes are seen in European capitals for securing the “commodities of the future.”
China’s Strategic Playbook: Dominance, Defense, and Demand
While the West scrambles, China is playing a strong hand built over decades. Beijing identified critical minerals as a strategic sector long before many competitors. Through a mix of industrial policy, overseas investment, and domestic resource control, China today is the undisputed leader in the critical minerals landscape. It operates vast mines at home – from rare earths in Inner Mongolia to graphite in Heilongjiang – and has systematically expanded abroad. Chinese state-owned companies have invested in lithium concessions in Latin America, bought stakes in cobalt and copper mines in Africa, and struck long-term supply contracts around the globeca.rbcwealthmanagement.com. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, Chinese firms have secured major shares in cobalt and copper projects (sometimes through “minerals-for-infrastructure” deals that build roads and power plants in exchange for mining rights)atlanticcouncil.orgatlanticcouncil.org. In Indonesia, Chinese-backed nickel processing plants have sprung up, so much that Chinese entities now control almost 75% of Indonesia’s nickel refining capacityca.rbcwealthmanagement.com. This web of investments ensures that China has a foot on nearly every continent’s critical mineral resourcesca.rbcwealthmanagement.com.
At the same time, China has nurtured formidable refining and manufacturing industries on its own soil. Decades of focused effort – including technology transfer and tolerating high environmental costs – have given China a near-monopoly in processing certain minerals. For example, complex chemical refining of rare earths, which is messy and polluting, became a Chinese specialty as other countries abandoned that niche. Similarly, Chinese refineries handle the bulk of cobalt from the Congo, lithium from Australia and Chile, and nickel from Indonesiagoldmansachs.com, turning raw ores into battery-grade chemicals ready for use in factories. This integrated approach (mine–refine–manufacture) means that China doesn’t just export raw materials; it exports finished products like electric vehicle batteries and magnets. In fact, over 75% of the world’s lithium-ion battery cell production takes place in China, as well as a majority of the magnets for wind turbines and electric motorsgoldmansachs.com. Beijing’s dominance is underpinned by huge domestic demand (China is the largest market for EVs and renewable energy) which has allowed its companies to scale up and drive down costs. It’s a virtuous cycle: demand pulls supply, supply feeds manufacturing, and the combined industry keeps China at the center of the green tech revolutionca.rbcwealthmanagement.comca.rbcwealthmanagement.com.
But China’s leaders also see this dominance as a geopolitical trump card – one they are increasingly willing to protect and wield. In recent years, as relations with the U.S. and Europe soured, Beijing has tightened its export control regime for critical minerals. Citing national security, China announced curbs in 2023–2025 on exports of materials like gallium and germanium (used in semiconductors) and certain rare earth elementsiea.org. Then in early 2025, China broadened controls to other obscure metals (tungsten, tellurium, etc.) crucial for defense and renewable technologiesiea.org. These moves were widely interpreted as retaliation for Western restrictions on China’s access to advanced microchips – effectively, minerals became a form of leverage in great-power competition. At the same time, China has consolidated its domestic mining sector for strategic minerals. It merged key rare earth companies into a state-controlled giant to better manage output and prices. It has also shown a willingness to weaponize its market position, as it famously did in 2010 by cutting off rare earth supplies to Japan during a diplomatic spatgoldmansachs.com. All of this signals that China views critical minerals as part of its defensive and offensive toolkit. Yet Beijing must also balance that leverage with caution: if it overplays its hand, it could simply accelerate the West’s diversification efforts. Indeed, China’s export curbs have already been a catalyst for the U.S. and EU to redouble their own sourcing initiativesiea.orgiea.org. Still, in the near term, China’s dominance is a reality that shapes every strategic decision by other nations in this arena. Any global shortage or supply shock would likely emanate from – or be solved in – Beijing, given its outsized role at each step of the critical mineral chain.
The Global South’s Leverage: Resource Nationalism and New Alliances
If China represents the refining superpower and the West the scrambling consumer, the Global South holds many of the raw material cards – and those countries are increasingly aware of their power. Nations rich in minerals across Africa, Latin America, and Asia are determined not to remain mere raw material exporters in the new green economy. This has led to a wave of resource nationalism and inventive partnerships as these countries seek a greater share of the value and a say in how minerals are developed.
Indonesia is a case in point. In 2020, it boldly banned exports of unprocessed nickel ore to force foreign companies to build smelters locally. The immediate result was a WTO challenge by the EU (which Indonesia lost in court) – but Jakarta pressed on regardlessherbertsmithfreehills.com. The long-term result has been transformative: Indonesia succeeded in attracting billions in investment for nickel processing and battery materials plants, especially from China. The country vaulted to the top tier of the EV supply chain virtually overnight. This success has not gone unnoticed. African countries with critical minerals are considering similar tactics. Zimbabwe, for example, banned raw lithium exports in 2022 after seeing Chinese and Western firms ship out its “white gold” with minimal local benefitmineralprices.com. The ban was aimed at spurring domestic processing and value-add – and indeed Chinese companies responded by investing in a local lithium processing plant in Zimbabwemineralprices.com. Such policies are not without challenges – investors fret, and some projects stall – but they reflect a broader determination in the Global South to avoid being relegated once again to the bottom of a colonial supply chain.
Countries in Latin America’s “Lithium Triangle” are likewise seeking greater control over their destiny. In 2023, Chile’s government announced plans to partially nationalize its lithium industry, insisting that any private company must partner with the state on new projectsnasdaq.com. Chile, the world’s #2 lithium producer, argued this move would help funnel more revenue to public coffers and ensure higher environmental standards. Mexico went even further, nationalizing its lithium deposits and creating a state lithium company in 2022 (though it has yet to produce lithium at scale). Bolivia, sitting on enormous lithium resources, has long kept mining under tight state control and is now cautiously inviting foreign partners – from China and elsewhere – but on its own terms. There is even talk of a “Lithium OPEC”: in recent years officials from Chile, Argentina, Bolivia (and potentially Brazil) have floated the idea of a cartel-like alliance to coordinate lithium policy and pricingforbes.commarket-insights.upply.com. While the prospects of a formal lithium cartel remain uncertain – differing national policies and market realities make it complicated – the very discussion signals a new mindset. These nations see their lithium not just as commodities to be sold to the highest bidder, but as strategic assets to be leveraged collectively. Together, Argentina, Bolivia and Chile control an estimated 60% of global lithium resources, a formidable blocnorthernminer.com. Even if a full cartel never materializes, we are witnessing far closer cooperation among these countries, including technology sharing and joint ventures to build battery plants in South America rather than simply exporting raw materialsmarket-insights.upply.com.
In Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo and its neighbors illustrate both the opportunities and perils of holding valuable minerals. The DRC is often dubbed a geological scandal for its immense riches – not just the majority of the world’s cobalt, but significant copper, lithium, and rare earth deposits as wellatlanticcouncil.org. That wealth, however, has historically fueled conflict and corruption more than development. In recent years, as demand for cobalt skyrocketed, Congolese leaders faced pressure to clean up their mining sector and capture more benefit for the country. DRC formed joint ventures with Chinese companies (like the Sicomines deal trading minerals for infrastructure), but later sought to renegotiate terms, arguing the deals unfairly favored the foreign partner. Now, with the global focus on critical minerals, Congo is being courted by new suitors. The United States, for instance, shifted its stance and has started to actively support investments in DRC’s minerals after years on the sidelinesatlanticcouncil.orgatlanticcouncil.org. In May 2025, a major deal saw U.S.-based KoBold Metals (backed by billionaires Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos) partnering with Australia’s AVZ Minerals to invest over $1 billion in a huge lithium project in DRCatlanticcouncil.org. That investment, enabled by U.S. diplomatic engagement, aims to develop the Manono lithium deposit – one of the world’s largest – in a way that might challenge China’s long-held sway in the countryatlanticcouncil.org. For resource-rich developing nations, this growing competition between East and West can be an opportunity to strike better bargains. But it can also bring new risks of proxy struggles and uneven deals. The DRC, for example, is balancing relationships with China (its biggest mining investor) and Western initiatives promising “responsible sourcing.” The Global South’s challenge is to convert this scramble into long-term development gains, rather than a short-term windfall for elites. Done right, critical minerals could fuel industrialization – as some countries aim to use their lithium or nickel to build domestic battery factories. Done wrong, they could entrench the old pattern of export enclaves and external dependency.
Communities on the Frontlines: Indigenous Lands and Environmental Stakes
Beneath the geopolitical chess game lies a human and environmental story. Many critical mineral deposits are located on or near indigenous peoples’ lands and sensitive ecosystems, raising tough questions about how to balance global demand with local rights and sustainability. From the high Andes to the Australian outback to the deserts of the American West, indigenous communities have often found themselves on the frontlines of this new resource rush – sometimes as partners, more often as protesters.
In the United States, a headline example has been Thacker Pass in Nevada, home to the country’s largest known lithium reserve. This remote slice of sagebrush country is also sacred ground to the Paiute-Shoshone tribes, who remember it as the site of an 1865 massacre of their ancestorstheguardian.com. When plans for a massive open-pit lithium mine accelerated (fast-tracked in the closing days of the Trump administration), local Native American communities objected vehemently. They argued that the mine would destroy ancestral burial sites and irreversibly scar a landscape they call Peehee Mu’huh (Rotten Moon)theguardian.comtheguardian.com. Environmental groups joined in, warning of impacts on wildlife and water. For supporters of the project, Thacker Pass symbolizes the trade-offs of the green transition: the lithium from these rocks could build batteries for millions of EVs, displacing oil consumption and cutting carbon emissions. But for opponents, that green promise rings hollow if it tramples indigenous rights and desert ecology. “We were not consulted when this mine was approved,” said one tribal descendant fighting the projecttheguardian.com. Despite protests and court challenges, construction on the mine began in 2023 after a federal judge ruled that it could proceed. The controversy has spurred calls for stronger consultation and consent processes with tribes on mining projects – an issue not just in Nevada, but wherever indigenous lands harbor valuable minerals.
Across the globe, similar tensions play out. In Chile’s Atacama, indigenous Atacameño communities have watched lithium companies pump brine from beneath ancestral salt flats, consuming extraordinary amounts of water in one of the driest places on Earth. They worry that lithium extraction – which involves evaporating brine to concentrate the mineral – is depleting groundwater and jeopardizing local livelihoods built around salt-flat ecology. Chile’s government, now aiming for tighter control over lithium, has promised to include indigenous stakeholders in new joint ventures and to impose stricter environmental standards. In neighboring Bolivia, Quechua and Aymara communities near the Uyuni salt flats have lobbied for years to ensure Bolivia’s eventual lithium bonanza benefits local people and doesn’t repeat the exploitation of the past. Even in wealthy countries, conflicts erupt: in Ontario, Canada, proposed mining in the “Ring of Fire” region – rich in nickel, cobalt, and rare earths – has met resistance from First Nations concerned about the impact on peatlands and rivers vital to their culture. In Sweden, the indigenous Sámi people have opposed plans for mining rare earth metals on reindeer grazing lands, forcing the government to weigh its green ambitions against indigenous rights.
Beyond cultural and spiritual concerns, the environmental impacts of critical mineral mining are a major flashpoint. By definition, a “green” technology supply chain starts in a very industrial, often dirty process: mining and refining. Cobalt mining in the DRC has been notorious for hazardous conditions, toxic pollution, and child labor in unregulated artisanal mines. In some mining areas, makeshift tunnels collapse with tragic frequency, and exposure to cobalt dust has been linked to health issues for miners. These human rights and safety abuses have given rise to initiatives for “ethical cobalt” and projects to formalize artisanal mining or exclude it from supply chains. Similarly, nickel mining and processing (for instance in Indonesia or the Philippines) can strip tropical forests and generate prodigious waste, including toxic tailings that risk contaminating oceans if not managed properly. Rare earth refining, as pioneered in China, produces radioactive and chemical wastes that have devastated local soil and water in places like Baotou, Inner Mongolia. The paradox is stark: to solve climate change, the world needs more mines, yet mining itself can threaten water, wildlife, and communities if done irresponsibly.
There is growing recognition that the race for critical minerals must not become a zero-sum game between climate imperatives and human rights. International efforts are under way to establish stronger standards for responsible mining. In 2023, the Minerals Security Partnership – a U.S-led coalition of 20+ allies – affirmed principles for high ESG (environmental, social, governance) standards in new projectswhitecase.comwhitecase.com. The idea is to encourage investment in mines that respect labor rights, consult communities, and minimize ecological harm, so that “clean” energy doesn’t carry a hidden dirty footprint. NGOs and even some governments have called for a global treaty on mining practices akin to climate agreementsclimatechangenews.comclimatechangenews.com. They argue that without coordinated action, the scramble for transition minerals could entrench corruption, violence, and ecological destruction in vulnerable regionsclimatechangenews.com. The coming years will test whether industry and governments can meaningfully shift mining to a more sustainable footing – or whether the pressures of surging demand will override such concerns. Ultimately, the people living atop these mineral deposits have the most to lose or gain. Ensuring they are heard, protected, and ideally made partners in prosperity is not just a moral imperative, but also practical. As one Congolese activist put it, “if the world needs our cobalt for batteries, they must ensure it benefits Congo too, otherwise it will only fuel our troubles.” The success of the green energy revolution may hinge not just on mining engineering, but on social engineering – forging a fairer deal for communities at the source.
New Alliances and Shifting Supply Chains in a High-Stakes Game
The intensifying competition for critical minerals is shaking up international alliances and redefining supply chains that have long been taken for granted. Countries are forging new partnerships, trade agreements, and security pacts centered around critical minerals – a dynamic reminiscent of oil politics in the 20th century, but now with a green tinge. This reordering is both cooperative and competitive: nations are banding together into blocs even as they jostle for advantage.
On one side, we see the emergence of a U.S.-led and allied grouping intent on reducing China’s stranglehold. The Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), launched in 2022, brings together the U.S., EU, Japan, Canada, Australia, and several resource-rich “partner” countries like Brazil, Vietnam, and Namibia. Its goal is to mobilize investment in new mines and processing plants in friendly jurisdictions, ensuring diversified supply. By 2024, the MSP had grown to 23 partners and even created an MSP Finance Network to coordinate funding through development bankswhitecase.comwhitecase.com. Likewise, bilateral deals have proliferated: the U.S. signed critical mineral pacts not only with Japan, but also negotiated one with the EU (allowing limited EU access to IRA benefits) and inked agreements with countries like Zambia and the DRC to support their battery supply chain development. The logic is clear – by investing in or sourcing from a broad array of friendly nations (including those in Africa and the Americas), the Western alliance hopes to reroute supply chains that currently run through China. There are also strategic security dialogues – for instance, India, the U.S., Japan and Australia (the Quad) have discussed collaborative mapping of rare earths and reciprocal supply arrangements, blending geopolitical alignment with resource policy.
Conversely, China is not standing alone; it is cultivating its own sphere of partnerships. Beijing has deepened ties with countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia through its Belt and Road Initiative, often with minerals as a key element of cooperation. In Africa, Chinese infrastructure loans and projects in nations like Guinea (bauxite for aluminum) and Zimbabwe (lithium) are partly aimed at locking in future raw material flows. China and Russia, while not formalizing a minerals alliance, have found common cause: Russia holds large nickel and aluminum assets, and with Western sanctions biting, China has become an even more crucial outlet and partner for Russian metals. Meanwhile, South-South cooperation is growing: countries like Indonesia have courted investors from South Korea and Japan as well as China for their nickel industry, playing multiple suitors against each other. And new forums are being floated – for example, African and South American nations discussed forming a “critical minerals club” at recent international summits to share knowledge and strengthen their bargaining positions.
The race has also led to some unlikely diplomatic courtships. The European Union, in a bid to secure rare earths and other materials, signed an agreement in 2022 with Namibia – a country rich in uranium and rare earth minerals – promising support for local value addition. The EU even struck a memorandum with Rwanda in 2024 to cooperate on sourcing tantalum and other mineralsatlanticcouncil.org. That deal drew criticism because Rwanda has been accused of funneling conflict minerals from neighboring DRC, highlighting how the scramble for resources can collide with ethical foreign policyatlanticcouncil.org. The United Kingdom has pursued its own deals, including a Critical Minerals Agreement with Canada in 2023, and sought closer ties with Australia on lithium and rare earths. Even former adversaries find minerals a reason to talk: after years of frosty relations, South Korea recently reopened dialogue with Japan about jointly developing rare earth supply (both aiming to be less dependent on China). In Southeast Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has put critical minerals collaboration on the agenda, as countries like Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia explore their rare earth and lithium potential – potentially with Japanese or Western help rather than Chinese.
All these maneuvers underscore a reality: supply chains for critical minerals are being rewired in real time, with high stakes for global industries. We are likely to see the emergence of more regional supply networks – for instance, a North American battery metal corridor linking Canadian nickel, U.S. lithium, and perhaps Mexican copper into an integrated chain feeding EV factories in Detroit and Ontario. Europe is eyeing something similar, pairing its own modest mines (in Scandinavia, Spain, etc.) with imports from allied countries like Australia, all refined in new European plants, then feeding European gigafactories. China, for its part, is doubling down on its vertically integrated model, but also investing in emerging hubs – for example, building battery factories in Hungary and mining lithium in Iran – to diversify its bets. The success or failure of these new supply architectures will determine not only who wins the economic benefits of the green transition, but also how smoothly and affordably that transition unfolds for the world. A more diversified, resilient supply chain could mean ample materials for all and a faster shift to clean energy. Conversely, if the world ends up splitting into isolated blocs – or if new projects can’t come online fast enough – shortages and price spikes could slow climate progress and even ignite new conflicts.
Already, recent flashpoints and deals hint at the stakes. In late 2024, China’s export ban on gallium (a minor metal for chips) sent semiconductor firms scrambling – an alarm bell for what could happen if lithium or rare earths were similarly choked offiea.org. In early 2025, the DRC’s government temporarily suspended cobalt exports to try to prop up falling prices – a move that rattled battery makers worldwideiea.org. Each such incident is a reminder that access to these minerals can no longer be taken for granted. In positive news, new mining investments are being announced at a dizzying pace: from a major rare earth mine in Greenland (backed by Australian and European firms) to a lithium extraction project in Bolivia involving a Chinese consortium and Bolivian state company. Every deal carries geopolitical weight. When a U.S.-supported company secures a mine in Congo, it’s seen as a win for the “free world” supply chainatlanticcouncil.org. When China finances a lithium refinery in Argentina, it’s extending its influence in America’s backyard. For the countries holding the resources, each partnership or agreement is judged by what it delivers locally – jobs, revenues, infrastructure, or perhaps just more broken promises.
As this great game plays out, nations are learning that cooperation may be as vital as competition. No one country can single-handedly meet the exploding demand for these minerals in the coming decades. Estimates suggest that by 2040, the world will need tens of times more lithium, nickel, and cobalt than today to meet climate goalsnpr.orgnpr.org. The pie is growing, and so is the incentive to find workable compromises. Some analysts have proposed creating strategic mineral stockpiles or even an international buying consortium, to prevent panic buying or coercion. Others suggest tying mineral deals to development goals, so that mining benefits are more equitably shared – making producer countries more willing partners and reducing the risk of resource-fueled instability. In essence, the race for critical minerals could usher in either a new era of strategic collaboration – recognizing our interdependence in the face of climate change – or a fractious scramble that mirrors the worst of 19th-century colonial rivalries. The outcome is still unwritten.
What is clear is that the old order is shifting. A decade ago, critical minerals were a niche topic; today they are discussed in the same breath as oil at OPEC meetings and as semiconductors at G7 summits. The world’s major powers and corporations are pouring investment into securing these supplies. And beneath the high politics, ordinary people from rural communities to factory floors are feeling the effects of this shifting landscape. The green energy transition, for all its promise, comes with a new set of dependencies and risks that the global community is only beginning to grapple with. How we manage the race for critical minerals – fairly, sustainably, peacefully – will help define the course of the 21st century, much as oil defined the 20th. The race is on, and the finish line is a planet powered by clean technology. Getting there will require not just innovation in batteries or solar panels, but innovation in policy, partnership, and perseverance in the face of daunting challenges. It is a race we cannot afford to lose, and one whose outcome will reverberate from the remotest mines to the highest corridors of power.
**
Editor’s Note: This topic was chosen today to highlight a pivotal issue at a moment of rapid developments. In recent weeks, the International Energy Agency’s 2025 outlook warned of rising supply risks as mineral refining remains highly concentratediea.org. At the same time, governments in the U.S., EU, and beyond have launched new initiatives – from critical mineral alliances to resource strategy shifts – underscoring that the race for critical minerals is entering a decisive phase. The confluence of fresh policy moves, geopolitical tensions, and growing calls for sustainable mining makes this a timely subject deserving close attention.climatechangenews.comatlanticcouncil.org
Leave a Reply